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The Caroline Affair in the 
Evolving International Law of 
Self-Defense  
M A T T H E W  C .  W A X M A N  
Review of Craig Forcese, Destroying the Caroline: The Frontier Raid that 
Reshaped the Right to War (Irwin Law, 2018)		
The story of the Caroline goes roughly like 
this: In the darkness of night on December 
29, 1837, an expedition of Canadian 
militia, under the authority of Great 
Britain, crossed the Niagara River to the 
U.S. shore where the American steamer 
Caroline was docked. Rebels fighting the 
Canadian government were encamped 
nearby, and the vessel had been used by 
sympathetic Americans to transport 
supplies and arms to the group. The 
Canadian raiding party set the Caroline 
ablaze and untied it from its moorings. 
Strong river currents quickly took the 
crumbling vessel over Niagara Falls. 
Subsequent public accounts were 
exaggerated and contradictory, but 
probably one American was killed during 
the raid and resulting firefight. 
Mutual diplomatic recriminations ensued 
and border tensions ran high for years. 
The U.S. side saw the raid as a flagrant, 
unprovoked attack against a neutral state. 
The British and Canadian side justified it 
as necessary to deal with security threats 
that the United States could not or would 
not deal with itself (or in today’s 
international parlance, the United States 
was unwilling or unable to neutralize the 
threat emanating from its territory). 
Moreover, the state of New York put a 
British subject on trial for murder arising 
from the raid, incensing the British 
government and public; the American 
federal government took the position that 
it did not have legal authority to intervene 
or order him released. At several points 
over the years of the dispute, war between 
the United States and Great Britain 
became a live possibility. Diplomatic 
efforts, taken over in 1841 by U.S. 
Secretary of State Daniel Webster and a 
new British envoy to the United States, 
Lord Ashburton (Alexander Baring), 
produced agreement on the law, and 
agreement to disagree on the facts. Soon 
thereafter the border issues were largely 
resolved by the Webster-Ashburton 
Treaty. 
Today, the Caroline incident is often 
thought of as a seminal international legal 
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episode about anticipatory self-defense. 
Webster’s statement on behalf of the 
United States, and Ashburton’s agreement 
with this part, that a state must show “a 
necessity of self-defense, instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, 
and no moment for deliberation,” is 
frequently invoked for the proposition that 
a state may use proportionate force in self-
defense against “imminent” threats. 
Although many international lawyers and 
scholars probably know the outlines of the 
story above, there is a rich and complex 
history surrounding the Caroline incident. 
These include, among others, the 
historical context of the insecure border 
areas of Canada and the United States 
that gave rise to rebellion among some 
Canadians and support for them among 
some Americans; the raid on the Caroline 
itself; reasons why the incident burned so 
furiously in public opinion in both Britain 
and the United States, even to the point of 
creating a serious possibility of war; the 
indictment and trial of British subject 
under British command who (accounts 
differ) took part in the raid and who was 
individually charged with murder in 
connection with it; the American federal 
government’s apparent lack of legal 
authority to end or remove the New York 
criminal case; and the already deep and 
complex economic relationships between 
Britain and the United States that might 
have been severely damaged by long-run 
tensions or outright war.  
This history, with its many strands, is 
explored by University of Ottowa law 
professor Craig Forcese in his excellent 
new book, “Destroying the Caroline: The 
Frontier Raid That Reshaped the Right to 
War.” It’s a story that has been told 
before; among those I have relied on are 
John E. Noyes’s chapter in “International 
Law Stories,” which focuses on the legal 
dimensions, for example, and Kenneth 
Stevens’s book, “Border Diplomacy: The 
Caroline and McLeod Affairs in Anglo-
American-Canadian Relations, 1837-
1842,” which focuses on the affair’s 
international political dimensions.  
Forcese’s book brings in rich, new 
historical details mined from archives and, 
moreover, provides additional 
understanding of the international legal 
context in which the Caroline affair took 
place. This includes a discussion of murky 
nineteenth-century thinking about the law 
of military force below the threshold of 
war, as well as the United States’ own 
assertions of self-defense in earlier forays 
into Spanish-held Florida. (In 1817–18, 
the shoe was on the other foot, as the 
United States justified military incursions 
of Spanish territory on the grounds that 
Spain was failing to prevent British, 
Indian, and other enemies from 
threatening the United States from 
havens across their border.)  
“Destroying the Caroline” also weaves the 
account of international law on the resort 
to force in the mid-19th century as it was 
understood in that period together with 
the story of the Caroline doctrine’s 
influence and use—as well as misuse—by 
states and international lawyers in 
contemporary debates about the use of 
force. Because the book is part history, 
part analysis of contemporary debates, 
and part links between them, it does not 
simply proceed chronologically. For that 
reason, it can sometimes feel like the 
analytic and narrative thread is jumping 
around; a virtue of this approach, 
however, is that the book’s organization 
makes it easy to pull specific chapters to 
study carefully on their own.  
One takeaway is that the Caroline episode 
“is remembered by chance, and not design” 
(p. 4). The book helps to at least somewhat 
explain how such a modest military 
incident takes on such grand international 
legal significance. Part of that story is the 
peculiar chain of citations to the episode, 
including misunderstanding of its facts. 
Part of that story also is the personalities 
involved. Although the raid on the 
Caroline occurs in December 1837, it is 
not until nearly five years later that 
Webster and Ashburton have their now-
famous exchange. That time lag is 
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important. In the immediate aftermath of 
the attack, international negotiation over 
the matter fell mostly to a pair of 
diplomatic mediocrities, U.S. Secretary of 
State John Forsyth and British 
Ambassador to the United States Henry 
Steven Fox. Had the matter been resolved 
quickly, it is unlikely that the incident 
would ever have taken on such 
international legal influence. It took the 
great intellectual, diplomatic, and legal 
firepower of their much more esteemed 
replacements—combined with the timing 
of their respective governments’ 
revitalized desire to resolve transatlantic 
friction—to help provide some 
authoritative clarity regarding the 
customary law of the resort to military 
force. 
Another takeaway is surprise that the 
Caroline has come to be associated today 
with customary state practice regarding 
anticipatory self-defense. After all, by the 
time of the raid, the insurgents using the 
vessel (who included many Americans) 
had crossed the Niagra River from New 
York and occupied a piece of Canadian 
territory. From there, they had shelled the 
Canadian mainland and shipping on the 
river. These developments arose weeks 
before the Caroline raid, and more 
insurgents and weapons were continuing 
to arrive. As Forcese says, the Caroline “is 
most easily viewed as an effort to degrade 
a weeks-old attack and its expansion, 
rather than as an attempt to forestall the 
first blows of a not-yet mounted assault” 
(p. 228). Yes, a standard for anticipatory 
self-defense can be extrapolated from 
Webster’s formula, but the actual facts 
were not a clean case of it. I confess to this 
error in my own past descriptions of the 
Caroline. “This repurposing of the 
Caroline in discussions of anticipatory 
self-defence,” Forcese reckons, “is 
astonishing” (p. 227). He is altogether 
correct. 
In light of the heavy contemporary 
reliance on Webster’s formula, including 
for anticipatory self-defense, Forcese uses 
the last part of the book to revisit the 
implications of the Caroline affair for 
recent debates about preemption, 
imminence, unwilling or unable 
standards, and related concepts. (It 
perhaps bears mentioning that what we 
think of today as the contemporary debate 
over “unable or unwilling” took place in 
the diplomatic correspondence over the 
Caroline, right down to the exact words: 
“The [American] authorities,” wrote Sir 
George Arthur to Lord Glenelg in 1838, 
“were either unable or unwilling to 
prevent aggression against Canada.”) 
Forcese does not try to propose clear 
resolutions to ongoing controversies, but 
instead tries to consider various modern 
arguments in light of the basic 
considerations that Webster and 
Ashburton wrestled with. In that effort I 
agree with his skepticism of rigid 
formalism and his conclusion that 
Webster’s formula itself need not be read 
as a bright-line rule, but instead can be 
read to accommodate more flexible 
standards.  
* * * 
Forcese is Canadian, but (especially as an 
American reader) I was reminded what an 
interesting U.S. foreign relations law story 
the Caroline affair is. The role of 
international law in courts during the 
episode is covered in other works like 
those I cited earlier, but Forcese’s history 
highlights some important U.S. 
constitutional war powers dimensions, too. 
Scholars of constitutional war powers 
naturally focus on wars. From that 
perspective, the 1830s are not a very 
interesting period. The United States 
fought a declared war in 1812 and 
launched military expeditions in the 
southeast soon after, and then it fought a 
declared war against Mexico in 1846. In 
between, relations along the U.S.-Canada 
border don’t seem to offer much. But the 
Caroline incident could very well have 
escalated to war and, as I’ve argued 
elsewhere in relation to the president’s 
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“power to threaten war,” constitutional 
war powers are just as much about wars 
that didn’t take place, especially when war 
didn’t take place because of a successful 
threat.  
In fall of 1841, according to Forcese’s 
research, Gen. Winfield Scott—a hero of 
the War of 1812—assessed the risk of 
escalation to another war against Britain 
at 50 percent. Although, as Forcese notes, 
this figure may be significantly 
overstated, the dangers were quite real. 
He details how senior British officials, 
from the prime minister on down, at 
several points over this years-long saga 
were fairly convinced that war might be 
imminent. 
Possible escalation scenarios included 
local American public pressure to 
retaliate; the possibility that New York 
state officials might prosecute and, if 
convicted, execute a British subject 
suspected of having participated in the 
Caroline raid; or that vigilantes from that 
New York area might assassinate one. 
Forcese details some steps along these 
precarious paths, including the 1840 
prosecution of Alexander McLeod, a 
British military veteran arrested and 
charged with an American death that had 
occurred in the assault on the Caroline 
three years earlier. He was ultimately 
acquitted, but had he instead been 
convicted and executed, war with Britain 
would perhaps have been unstoppable. 
By the time McCleod was acquitted by a 
New York jury, both the New York state 
trial court and the New York state habeas 
court had rejected the international law 
argument—an argument advanced by 
both the British and the U.S. federal 
governments—that McLeod, like any 
soldier, was immune from such personal 
liability for a public act in service to his 
sovereign. The takeaway for Britain and 
foreign sovereigns was, in effect, that 
America’s federal government was not 
master of its own house in the conduct of 
its foreign affairs. The reputational harm 
was considerable. This prompted Congress 
to extend the habeas statute to allow 
federal courts to consider similar claims in 
the future.  
More broadly, the federal system was at 
this time showing some strains in 
assuring foreign sovereigns of its 
adherence to international law. It 
exhibited other weaknesses in assuring 
peace, too. Soon after the raid, for 
example, President Van Buren dispatched 
Gen. Scott to the northern border—
ostensibly to defend the U.S. from further 
incursions, but mostly to help suppress 
direct support by Americans for the 
Canadian rebels. Van Buren wanted Scott 
to reinforce American neutrality.  
Scott had few regular, federal troops to 
work with, however. Most of those in 
national military service at that time were 
tied up fighting the Seminoles in the 
South or guarding the western frontier. In 
instructing Scott to therefore make use of 
the militias of the northern states, 
Secretary of War J.R. Poinsett warned the 
general to enlist, as much as possible, only 
those “exempt from the state of excitement 
which the late violation of our territory 
has created.” In other words, not only was 
Scott forced to rely on state militia forces 
that he knew were far inferior to federal 
regulars, some of those state militia forces 
were likely to be especially unreliable 
because of their dubious loyalty to the 
strict federal policy of neutrality. On top of 
that, Scott lacked statutory authority to 
do much with military forces in any case. 
Fifty years after the Constitution was 
drafted, the Caroline incident turned on 
its head certain important assumptions 
and reasoning by some of the Framers as 
to what was likely to lead to war and 
what, by contrast, was likely to induce 
peace. Many of those who would 
eventually be called “Republicans” worried 
that creating a powerful national military 
establishment would make the United 
States more prone to war. But the 
Caroline affair is a chapter of American 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3240618 
	 The Caroline Affair | M. Waxman		
	 5 
history in which the weakness of the 
national military establishment created 
serious risk of war. That same national 
military weakness, moreover, made it 
difficult for the United States to comply 
with the international law of neutrality – 
in considerable part from the inability to 
compel its own citizens to comply. In this 
case, a weak national military 
establishment resulted in greater, not 
lesser, risk to the Framers' desire that the 
United States be viewed a respectable 
member of the community of nations. 
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